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LET FREEDOM RING:
BROADENING FOIA’S PUBLIC DOMAIN
AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
KAYLA BERLIN *
This Comment examines the waiver doctrine, which requires the
government to reveal information it could normally withhold under an
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) because the
information is deemed to have already entered the public domain. The
Comment begins by tracing the origin of FOIA as an improvement upon
the inadequate Administrative Procedure Act. Second, the Comment
discusses the competing tests used in determining when information has
entered the public domain—the D.C. Circuit’s permanent public record test
and the Ninth Circuit’s unlimited disclosure test—as well as their
application in a case involving the film Zero Dark Thirty. Next, the
Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit’s test frustrates the purpose of FOIA,
and that the Ninth Circuit’s test offers an alternative that can allow for
greater dissemination of information without unduly threatening legitimate
privacy interests. The Comment closes with a recommendation that
Congress should amend FOIA in order to clarify the public domain
doctrine by officially adopting the Ninth Circuit’s unlimited disclosure test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most members of the public were not in any way involved in the Iran
Hostage Crisis, nor did they have any direct role in the hunt for Osama Bin
Laden. The government often keeps the details of such events secret,
prompting citizens to turn to the somewhat dubious source of Hollywood
for answers as to how these events unfolded. 1 Is it really desirable for the

*J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2015; BA., Georgetown University, 2011. The author
would like to thank Loyola Law professor Kevin Lapp for his advisement on this Comment, as
well as the staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their aid in editing.
1. See e.g., ARGO (GK Films, Smokehouse Pictures 2012); ZERO DARK THIRTY
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public to glean their knowledge of some of the biggest national crises and
military operations in this nation’s history from films like Argo 2 and Zero
Dark Thirty? 3 Or should such information be accessible to the public?
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 4 in 1966
after a decade of debate amongst various government entities regarding the
disclosure of government information to the public.5 The act arose as a
revision of Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
expanding the disclosure of federal agency records to the public.6 In
general, FOIA allows any person to request and obtain access to federal
agency records, 7 unless the records sought are protected from disclosure by
one of nine exemptions laid out in the act.8 Congress intended courts to
construe all nine exemptions narrowly to allow for the broad dissemination
of information to the public.9 The third exemption protects information
that is specifically exempted from public disclosure by another statute.10
(Annapurna Pictures 2012).
2. ARGO (GK Films, Smokehouse Pictures 2012).
3. ZERO DARK THIRTY (Annapurna Pictures 2012).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
5. See Freedom of Information Act Guide: Introduction, U.S. DOJ (May 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/oip/introduc.htm.
6. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38-40 (1965) (The Administrative Procedure Act has
glaring loopholes which have resulted in its being “cited as statutory authority for the withholding
of virtually any piece of information that an official or an agency does not wish to disclose.”); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 26 (1966) (stating that FOIA is intended to revise the previous
law which, because of vague language, had been falling short of its intended public disclosure
goals).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (detailing the information subject to disclosure and procedural
requirements for disclosure).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (detailing the nine exemptions to disclosure).
9. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, supra note 6, at 38 (“It is the purpose of the present bill . . . to
establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under
clearly delineated statutory language.”).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (providing that information is specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute as long as that statute is not discretionary or establishes specific criteria for
withholding the information or refers to specific types of matters to be withheld, and specifically
cites to this section if enacted after the date of the enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009
[enacted Oct. 28, 2009]); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-880, at 9 (1976) (asserting that a statute
which only permits withholding, rather than requiring it, would not fall under exemption three).
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This exemption is often invoked by agencies in order to properly protect
classified information that relates to national defense from public
disclosure. 11
Courts may find that an agency waived its protection under one of the
FOIA exemptions using the public domain doctrine. The prevailing view
of this doctrine, set out by the D.C. Circuit, is that information loses its
protection once it has been preserved in a “permanent public record.” 12
However, a 2011 Ninth Circuit opinion recently departed from this view,
constructing a new test that greatly restricts the power of the FOIA
exemptions to prevent public disclosure of information. 13
In Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
court laid out a new unlimited disclosure test which allowed any disclosure
to a third party, without limiting that party’s further disclosures of the
information, to constitute a public disclosure of the information sufficient
to waive an exemption to disclose pursuant to FOIA. 14 Waiver now occurs
if the information was simply disclosed to a third party and no longer
requires preservation in a permanent public record. 15 This test broadens the
category of information that would be considered in the public domain,
thus narrowing the application of the statutory exemptions to FOIA
disclosure and requiring the revelation of more information to the public.16

11. See Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 91, 136 (2003).
12. See Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Under our public domain
doctrine, materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak
once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.”); see also Students Against
Genocide v. Dept. of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The government may not rely
on an otherwise valid exemption to justify withholding information that is already within the
‘public domain.’”).
13. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th
Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[w]hen an agency freely discloses to a third party confidential
information covered by a FOIA exemption without limiting the third party’s ability to further
disseminate the information then the agency waives the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA
request for the disclosed information.”).
14. See id. at 1197 (“This no-strings-attached disclosure thus voids any claim to
confidentiality and constitutes a waiver of Exemption 4.”).
15. Id. at 1198.
16. See Patrick Lightfoot, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Nondisclosure Under FOIA’s
Exemption 4: The Scope and Applicability of the Waiver Doctrine, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 807, 828829 (2012).
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This split in the circuits creates uncertainty in the judicial system,
which is detrimental to the government, business, and society as a whole.
If there is no specified test for determining what constitutes a public
disclosure sufficient to waive a FOIA exemption, government agencies,
business entities, and individuals will be less likely to reveal any
confidential information at all. These individuals and entities will have no
way of knowing what action they must take in order to protect themselves
from inadvertently waiving a FOIA exemption, prompting them to keep all
information private. This could result in a decrease in the release of
information to the public, directly contrary to FOIA’s purpose to “establish
a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” 17 This is especially
problematic given the structure of the federal court system—a court in the
D.C. Circuit may find that something has entered the public domain, while
a court in the Ninth Circuit may reach the opposite conclusion.18
The impact of these conflicting tests is demonstrated by a recent case
in the D.C. Circuit, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Defense.19
Judicial Watch examined the issue of public disclosure under Exemption
3 20 of FOIA. 21 In Judicial Watch, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
new test in favor of following the well-established precedent of the D.C.
Circuit, holding that the disclosure of the names of a Navy SEAL and two
CIA agents to the filmmakers of Zero Dark Thirty did not constitute a
public disclosure sufficient to waive Exemption 3. 22 The district court was
bound by the older, restrictive precedent in the D.C. Circuit; 23 under the

17. S. REP. NO. 89-813, supra note 6, at 38.
18. See generally Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 963 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C.
2013) (discussing the different approaches used by the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit in
assessing whether something has entered the public domain).
19. See generally id.
20. See Freedom of Information Act Guide: Exemption 3, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May
2004), http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption3.htm (explaining that Exemption 3 allows any
information that is covered by a non-disclosure provision in another federal statute to be
exempted from disclosure).
21. See Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. at 11-12.
22. See id. at 15-16 (arguing that withholding of information under an exemption is only
“pointless” when that information has been truly made known to the public, thus all other
instances of disclosure should not waive a FOIA exemption).
23. See id. at 12 (“This circuit has held that the government may not rely on an otherwise
valid exemption to justify withholding information that is already in the ‘public domain.’”).
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Ninth Circuit’s broader rule, the court likely would have determined that
the information had entered the public domain, waiving Exemption 3.24
Such a result would have been more desirable than the one reached in the
case because it is consistent with the public disclosure goal of the statute
and gives the public a better opportunity to learn valuable information
regarding a seminal military action. 25
Using the context of the facts surrounding Judicial Watch, this
Comment will explore the competing tests for determining when
information has entered the public domain. Part II outlines the legislative
history of the Freedom of Information Act, beginning with its precursor,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and following with the evolution of
FOIA. Part III first examines the divergent views of the public domain
doctrine, beginning with the D.C. Circuit’s prevailing view of the
permanent public record test. Part III then delves into the Ninth Circuit’s
new unlimited disclosure test, and examines the court’s application of both
tests in Judicial Watch. Part IV discusses the impact of these disparate
tests on society, and argues that the Ninth Circuit’s rule better addresses the
purpose of FOIA without making its reach too broad. Finally, Part V
proposes a call to action, in which Congress should amend FOIA and make
the Ninth Circuit’s test the governing rule. If Congress refuses to amend
FOIA, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to determine whether the
D.C. Circuit or the Ninth Circuit’s rule should apply in cases concerning
the public domain doctrine in relation to FOIA.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. The Administrative Procedure Act: A Withholding Statute
Congress adopted the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in 1946
in the wake of World War II as an attempt to find a balance between
increasing demands from both news media and the public for greater
transparency in government agencies, and President Roosevelt’s desire to
keep certain information confidential for national security purposes.26
24. See id. at 15 (explaining that the court is not persuaded by Judicial Watch’s argument
that the court adopt the Ninth Circuit’s test).
25. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, supra note 6, at 38 (“Success lies in providing a workable
formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure.”).
26. See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 19662006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest in Knowing
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Though well-intentioned, the APA contained giant loopholes that
government agencies regularly exploited in order to withhold any
information that they did not wish to reveal.27 The act allowed exemptions,
for example, when the information involved required “secrecy in the public
interest” 28 or was “required for good cause to be held confidential,”29 but it
did not explain the meaning of these vague terms. 30
In 1951, President Truman issued an executive order permitting, for
the first time, non-military citizens to classify information, and thus
withhold it from public disclosure under the APA; this action served to
underline the APA’s inadequacies and increase the call for reform. 31 Both
the House and Senate reports which accompanied Senate Bill 1160
(“FOIA”), enacted fifteen years later, note two main deficiencies in the
APA: (1) the vague language of its exemptions allowing for the act to
essentially become a withholding statute, and (2) the absence of a remedy
for citizens from whom the government wrongfully withholds
information. 32 Congress attempted to rectify these issues by amending the
public information section of the APA. 33

What the Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 521 (2006) (stating that the purpose
of the APA was to establish standard procedures for disclosure of information to the public
among the government’s various agencies, “[a] public information provision, Section 3, was
included in the APA to provide for access to ‘matters of official record’ held by government
agencies.”).
27. See id. at 522.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C § 552 (2012)).
29. Id.
30. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 40 (1965).
31. See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 26, at 523.
32. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, supra note 30, at 40 (breaking down the vague language
issues, focusing on three distinct phrases: the exception for “any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest,” the limitation on the requirement that all case opinions
be made public “except those required for good cause to be held confidential,” and the
requirement that public records must be made available to “persons properly and directly
concerned except information held for good cause found.”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 29-32
(1966) (indirectly listing the major deficiencies of the APA by highlighting the major changes
FOIA brings: it eliminates the “persons properly and directly concerned” test to determine who is
allowed access to public records; it replaces vague standards for exemptions with specific
categories, and it provides a remedy via an appeal in District Court).
33. See id. at 38 (“[T]he present public information section of the Administrative
Procedure Act has been used more as an excuse for withholding than as a disclosure statute.”).
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B. The Freedom of Information Act: an Improvement on the APA
Congress amended Section 3 of the APA in 1966, enacting FOIA in
an attempt to meet the disclosure goals of which the APA fell short. 34
FOIA expanded access to public information beyond just “persons properly
and directly concerned,” allowing anyone to make a request and receive
information. 35 FOIA presumes disclosure; the government has the burden
of proving that the information falls within one of nine exemptions36 and
thus exempt from disclosure. 37 The Act, “does not apply to records held by
Congress, state or local governments, the courts, private individuals or
private companies, including private entities under federal contracts,” the
President, or any of the President’s personal staff. 38 The Act further
provides a remedy for wronged citizens—creating a system of judicial
review and allowing them to air their grievances in court.39
FOIA did not, however, immediately bring about a new, open
government. 40 There remained heavy bureaucratic resistance to FOIA and

34. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (stating that the APA fell “far short of its
disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute and less of a
disclosure statute,” and noting that FOIA remedied, or attempted to remedy, many of these
issues).
35. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, supra note 30, at 40.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (listing the nine exemptions: (1) information that is
“properly classified,” under an Executive Order, to protect national security; (2) information
“related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;” (3) information that is
“exempted from disclosure by [another federal] statute;” (4) “trade secrets and [privileged or
confidential] commercial or financial information;” (5) communications within or between
agencies which are protected by legal privileges; (6) “personnel and medical files and similar
files” that, if disclosed, “would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;” (7)
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” if one of the six specified
harms could or would result; (8) matters that are “contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency” tasked with
regulating or supervising financial institutions; (9) “geological and geophysical information and
data . . . concerning wells.”).
37. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 963 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2013); see
Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 26, at 516.
38. See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 26, at 515.
39. See Patrick Lightfoot, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Nondisclosure Under FOIA’s
Exemption 4: The Scope and Applicability of the Waiver Doctrine, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 807, 812,
812 & n.39 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
40. Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms: Scalia, Rumsfeld,
Cheney Opposed Open Government Bill, Congress Overrode President Ford's Veto of Court
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there were several administrative issues in the operation of the Act. It
became clear to Congress that FOIA only truly allowed citizens access to
information after they resorted to costly litigation.41 In the aftermath of the
Watergate scandal and the Nixon administration, Congress first amended
FOIA in 1974, 42 and five times thereafter. 43
C. Exemption 3: Other Statutory Exemptions
Exemption 3 of FOIA prevents disclosure of information otherwise
protected by another statute.44 Exemption 3 is frequently invoked by

Review, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE (Nov. 23, 2004)
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm.
41. Id. (“The House Subcommittee on Government information identified a number of
general problems with the FOIA including: [e]xcessive delays in responding to document
requests; [e]xcessive fees for searching and copying documents; [b]urdensome and costly legal
remedies after exhaustion of administrative remedies; [n]ews media opting not to use the FOIA
due to excessive delays and burdensome appellate procedures, and [i]nappropriate and inadequate
agency regulations and policies regarding the FOIA, poor administration and recordkeeping
regarding FOIA processes and a failure to inform members of the public of their rights under the
FOIA.”).
42. Id. (The passage of the first amendment to FOIA was difficult. The House primarily
focused on making changes to the administration of the Act “rather than [making] substantive
changes to the exemptions.” However, when it became clear that the Ford administration
opposed many of the changes, the Senate proposed new substantive changes to exemptions 1 and
7. President Ford vetoed the bill, expressing concern over the newly amended in camera review
and investigatory files exemptions. The media did not receive Ford’s veto well, as he had entered
office on a campaign promising open government. Congress later overrode his veto and passed
the amendments).
43. FOIA Legislative History, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE,
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (last visited Oct 24, 2014)
(stating that Congress revised Exemption 3 in 1976, addressed the fees charged for requesters and
the scope of the public’s access to law enforcement and national security records in 1986, and
limited the ability of foreign agents to request U.S. intelligence agents’ records following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in 2002); H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 11 (1996) (indicating
that Congress updated FOIA in response to new challenges brought on by the use of electronic
information technology in 1996); H.R. REP. NO. 107-592, at 27 (2002) (indicating that Congress
limited the ability of foreign agents to request records of U.S. intelligence agents due to the
burdensome strain on resources that has resulted as a byproduct of terrorism); OPEN Government
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2524, 2527 (indicating that one of Congress’s
goals was to simplify the requester process in 2007); see generally OPEN FOIA Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-83, sec. 64, § 552(b)(3), 123 Stat. 2141, 2184 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(3) (Supp. IV 2010)) (revising Exemption 3 in 2009).
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (providing that matters are “specifically exempted from
disclosure” if a statute (1) “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner
as to leave no [agency] discretion on the issue; or” (2) “establishes particular criteria for
withholding [the information] or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld, and” (3) the
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government agencies when attempting to avoid disclosing properly
classified information concerning national defense.45 For example, in
Judicial Watch, the government sought—successfully—to withhold the
names of four CIA officers and a Navy SEAL from a FOIA requester by
invoking Exemption 3, even though the government had already revealed
the names to a private party. 46 The government relied on two statutes: (1)
10 U.S.C. § 130(b)(a) which “authoriz[es] the Secretary of Defense to
withhold ‘personally identifying information regarding . . . any member of
the armed forces assigned to . . . a routinely deployable unit;’” and (2) 50
U.S.C. § 3507 which “exempt[s] the [CIA] from ‘the provisions of any . . .
law which require[s] the publication or disclosure of the . . . names . . . of
personnel employed by the Agency.’” 47 Like all nine FOIA exemptions,
Exemption 3 is subject to waiver under the public domain doctrine.48
III. TWO DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN DOCTRINE
A. The D.C. Circuit: “Preservation in a Permanent Public Record”
Though information may fall within the realm of a FOIA exemption,
the Act may still require disclosure if that exemption has been waived.49 In
Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Ninth
Circuit held that the “release of certain documents waives FOIA
exemptions only for those documents released.” 50 Thus, a prior disclosure
can waive a FOIA exemption for the document disclosed.51 There is a
general presumption in favor of disclosure, and the burden of proving that

statute was enacted after the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009 was enacted, and “specifically cites to this
paragraph”—that is, cites to § 552(b)(3)).
45. See Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 91, 136 (2003).
46. Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 8, 11.
47. Id. at 11-12 (alterations in original).
48. See Lee, supra note 45, at 136.
49. See Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002).
50. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989)
(alteration in original).
51. See id.
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an exemption applies in a particular case falls with the government
agency. 52 However, once the government agency has satisfied this burden,
the burden shifts back to the party requesting the information to prove that
the agency has waived its exemption via prior public disclosure.53
The public domain test is the prevailing view amongst the Circuit
Courts of Appeals for determining whether a prior disclosure has waived
the applicability of a FOIA exemption.54 It focuses primarily on whether
the information the government agency wishes to conceal was already in
the public domain when the plaintiff made his or her FOIA request. 55 The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged this rule in Herrick v. Garvey, which held that
the “[w]aiver doctrine stands for the proposition that the government
cannot rely on an otherwise valid exemption [to FOIA] to justify
withholding information that has been ‘officially acknowledged’ or is in
the ‘public domain.’” 56
For information to be considered within the public domain, the D.C.
Circuit has held that the information must have been “disclosed and
preserved in a permanent public record.” 57 The logic behind the doctrine is
relatively simple: if information is already publicly known, there is no
purpose for the government agency to withhold it from disclosure to the

52. See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
53. See id. (“These courts have made it clear that, while it is generally true that the
government bears the burden of proving that its withholding of information is justified by one or
more of the Act’s exemptions, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B), a plaintiff asserting a claim of prior
disclosure must bear the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain
that appears to duplicate that being withheld.”).
54. See Patrick Lightfoot, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Nondisclosure Under FOIA’s
Exemption 4: The Scope and Applicability of the Waiver Doctrine, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 807, 808
(2012).
55. Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he government may not rely on an otherwise valid exemption to justify withholding
information that is already within the ‘public domain.’”) (quoting Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550,
554 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130 (asserting that a plaintiff must point to “specific
information in the public domain” in order for the waiver of an FOIA exemption to apply); see
Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Under our public domain doctrine,
materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once
disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.”).
56. Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1193 (citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554; see also Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 836.
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public via an exemption. 58 However, what constitutes preservation in a
public record is not entirely clear. A common law rule establishes that
tapes played in open court become part of the public domain, but
recordings simply provided to opposing counsel in accordance with the law
and not played in open court do not constitute disclosure into the public
domain. 59 The D.C. Circuit has also held that the FOIA exemptions
applying to documents regarding meetings between a U.S. Ambassador and
the Iraqi President were not waived by the Ambassador when he testified
publicly about those meetings in two congressional hearings. 60
In Students Against Genocide v. Department of State, the D.C. Circuit
considered the question of whether a classified spy plane and satellite
photographs of the destruction wrought in Bosnia in 1995, shown by U.S.
Ambassador Madeleine Albright to the United Nations Security Council,
constituted public disclosure so as to waive Exemptions 1 and 3 of FOIA. 61
After Ms. Albright’s presentation, the Clinton administration released three
of the photographs to the delegates in an attempt to “‘put pressure on the
Bosnian Serbs to support a new peace effort being promoted among
European allies and the warring parties in the Balkans.’” 62 In response to a
FOIA request, the government released fourteen additional photographs,
but withheld the rest citing national security reasons pursuant to
Exemptions 1 and 3. 63 The court upheld the exemptions—the public
domain doctrine did not apply because the photographs had only been
shown to the Security Council delegates and not released to the general
public. 64 Furthermore, the court determined that the government’s release
58. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the information is publicly available, one wonders, why is it burning up counsel
fees to obtain it under FOIA? But the logic of FOIA compels the result: if identical information is
truly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its purposes.”).
59. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554-56 (“[A] constitutionally compelled disclosure to a
single party simply does not enter the public domain.”).
60. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11 F.3d 198, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
61. Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 830, 833.
62. Id. at 830 (quoting Barbara Crossette, U.S. Seeks to Prove Mass Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1995, at A3).
63. Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 834.
64. See id. at 836 (“The photographs in question here plainly do not fall within that
doctrine. They were not released to the general public; only the Security Council delegates saw
them. In fact, they were not ‘released’ at all . . . there is no ‘permanent public record’ of the
photographs.”).
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of some of the photographs into the public domain did not mean that there
remained no justifiable reason to withhold the rest.65
While the D.C. Circuit determined that limited disclosure to delegates
at the U.N. did not constitute waiver, 66 they have found that disclosure in a
public courtroom does waive a FOIA exemption in Cottone v. Reno. 67
There, the D.C. Circuit denied application of an exemption to a FOIA
requester. 68 In Cottone, during a criminal trial, the government played in
open court surreptitiously recorded telephone conversations, as well as
conversations recorded via a wire during face-to-face interactions with the
defendant. 69 The court reporter noted in the trial transcript that the tapes
“had been played for the court and jury,” and further indicated the specific
“date and time that the conversation had been recorded,” and the “unique
identification number assigned to that tape at trial.” 70 The government
never made a motion to place the tapes under seal, either during trial or
afterwards. 71 The FBI redacted the tapes prior to handing them over to
Cottone pursuant to his request, prompting Cottone to bring suit. 72 In
holding that the tapes did not fall under the proposed exemption, the court
deferred to the established common-law right to inspection and copying of
judicial records as providing the basis for determining that once played in
court and received into evidence, audio tapes have entered the public
domain. 73
65. In fact, the court seems to take the opposite view—the government’s release of some
of the photographs bolsters the court’s belief in its good faith reasons for withholding the rest of
them. See id. at 835 (“The fact that some ‘information resides in the public domain does not
eliminate the possibility that further disclosures can cause harm to intelligence sources, methods
and operations’ . . . particularly because the government did release numerous photographs, we
see no reason to question its good faith in withholding the remaining photographs on national
security grounds.”) (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
66. See Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 836.
67. Cottone, 193 F.3d at 552.
68. Id. at 556.
69. Id. at 552.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 553.
72. Id.
73. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554 (“[O]ur decisions construing the venerable common-law
right to inspect and copy judicial records make it clear that audio tapes enter the public domain
once played and received into evidence.”).
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The court also placed an affirmative obligation on the government to
remove the tapes from the public domain, via destruction or placing them
under seal, in order to avoid waiver. 74 Furthermore, it clarified its decision
in Davis v. U.S. Department of Justice that “to satisfy the burden of
production in public-domain cases, the FOIA requester may have to
produce a ‘hard copy’ version of what he requests,” 75 but this does not
mean that the requester must substantiate every public domain claim with a
hard copy duplicate of the requested material.76 Essentially, the permanent
public record test requires that the information be set down in some
tangible, public way. 77 The test broadens the power of the FOIA
exemptions, allowing many instances of information revealed to the public
(such as through testimony in open court) to remain exempt from
disclosure under the act. 78
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Departure from
the Established Permanent Public Record Test:
The New Unlimited Disclosure Test
In Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 79 the
Ninth Circuit departed from the well-established D.C. Circuit rule for
determining public domain via disclosure in a permanent public
recordpermanent public record and instead adopted a new, narrower
approach to applying the FOIA exemptions, specifically Exemption 4
(protecting financial and commercial information). 80
74. See id. (“[U]ntil destroyed or placed under seal, tapes played in open court and
admitted into evidence—no less than the court reporter’s transcript, the parties’ briefs, and the
judge’s orders and opinions—remain a part of the public domain.”).
75. Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (involving a
FOIA request made by an author for tape recordings developed by the FBI as part of a large
criminal investigation. Neither party was able to establish exactly which of the tapes, and which
portions of their contents, had actually been played in the courtroom, thus the court determined
that the requester had failed to meet its burden of “pointing to specific information in the public
domain.”).
76. Cottone, 193 F.3d at 555.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir.
2011).
80. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (2012) (Exemption 4 exempts information that concerns
business trade secrets or other confidential commercial or financial information).
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1. The Factual Underpinning of Watkins
In Watkins, a copyright and trademark attorney brought a FOIA
action, seeking to have the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) release notices of seizure of infringing merchandise imported in
various sea ports. 81 Commercial importers provide information on these
notices of seizure including the port of entry, the type of merchandise being
imported, the quantity of merchandise, and the name and address of the
exporter and importer.82 The government’s policy in keeping this
information confidential rests on the rationale that confidentiality will
encourage importers to give accurate information. 83 The government,
therefore, only uses this information to notify trademark owners when they
have seized goods that use counterfeit marks infringing upon a registered
trademark. 84 In response to Watkins’ FOIA request, the government
disclosed heavily redacted notices of seizure, citing several exemptions.85
Watkins then filed suit to obtain the unredacted notices, arguing that the
CBP’s act of sending the notices to trademark owners constituted a public
disclosure, thus waiving the Financial and Commercial Information
Exemption. 86 The District Court held that while the notices fell under
Exemption 4, confidentiality had not been waived by CBP’s release of the
notices to affected trademark owners because CBP had a statutory
obligation to make such disclosures to those third parties. 87

81. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192.
82. See id. (“The Notices of Seizure include the following information: (1) the date the
merchandise was imported; (2) the port of entry; (3) description of the merchandise; (4) quantity
of the merchandise; (5) country of origin of the merchandise; (6) name and address of the
exporter; (7) name and address of the importer; and (8) the name and address of the
manufacturer.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1193.
86. See id.
87. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1193 (“[T]he Agency’s release of the Notices to affected
trademark holders did not waive Exemption 4. The Agency was statutorily obligated to provide
such ‘limited disclosure[s] to interested third parties.’”).
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2. Abandoning the Permanent Public Record:
The Unlimited Disclosure Test
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision, holding
that CBP had in fact waived its right to rely on Exemption 4 because the
notices were already in the public domain.88 The Ninth Circuit stated that
when CBP discloses these notices to the affected trademark owners, it does
not place any limits on how the trademark owner may use the information
found in the notice. 89 The court then went on to reason that this “nostrings-attached” disclosure voided any claim that CBP could make of
confidentiality and constituted a waiver of Exemption 4. 90
The court acknowledged the permanent public record test articulated
by the D.C. Circuit as the prevailing rule on the issue, but argued that “it
should not be the only test for government waiver.” 91 In expressing the
desire for a different rule, the court drew a distinction between the nature of
the cases which have applied the D.C. Circuit’s public domain test—often
situations involving criminal prosecutions or national security concerns 92—
and the facts of this case involving trademark infringement. 93 The court
reasoned that the concerns which underlined the government’s interest in
keeping the requested information confidential in those cases—i.e. national
security and public safety—did not have any relevance in this situation. 94
Furthermore, none of the cases applying the permanent public
recordpermanent public record test involved the government making a “no88. Id. at 1196.
89. See id. at 1197 (explaining that the trademark owner “can freely disseminate the
Notice to his attorneys, business affiliates, trade organizations, the importer’s competitors, or the
media in a way that would compromise the purportedly sensitive information about an offending
importer’s trade operations.”).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The court refers to Cottone v. Reno, discussed above, as well as Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A.
and Afshar v. Department of State, cases involving the disclosure of various CIA documents and
the location of a CIA station, and the disclosure of CIA and FBI investigation documents,
respectively. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197.
93. See id.
94. Id. (“Most cases applying the public domain test have grappled with requests for
sensitive information involving high level criminal investigations or matters of national security .
. . [i]n such cases, the presumption in favor of disclosure must yield to overriding concerns for
public safety and national security—concerns not relevant to the case at bar.”).
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strings-attached” disclosure of the protected information to a private third
party. 95
The court then articulated its new test for determining when
information has been released into the public domain, so as to constitute a
waiver of a FOIA exemption: “when an agency freely discloses to a third
party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption without
limiting the third-party’s ability to further disseminate the information then
the agency waives the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA request for
the disclosed information.” 96
The court admitted that the D.C. Circuit’s public domain test is
appropriate in most cases, and tailored its holding to the facts in Watkins
and to similar situations.97 In doing so, the court argued that when taken to
the extreme with the facts presented here, the current public domain test
would produce absurd results, protecting the information under Exemption
4 even if the CBP had disclosed it to every person who would possibly
want to know it. 98
C. Judicial Watch’s Analysis and Application
of the Competing Public Domain Tests
1. Background Factual Information Concerning
Zero Dark Thirty and the FOIA Request
Zero Dark Thirty revolves around a CIA officer’s obsessive search to
find and ultimately kill Osama Bin Laden after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. 99 In making the film, the filmmakers (director
95. Here the court specifically points to Students Against Genocide v. Department of
State, arguing that it is the closest analog to the facts in this case, but is still distinguishable. The
court argues that in Students Against Genocide, the government’s procedure specifically
prevented the U.N. Security Council members from learning highly classified information about
U.S. reconnaissance systems—the government displayed the pictures, but did not distribute or
turn them over to the members of the Council for further inspection. See id.
96. Id. at 1198.
97. See id. at 1197-98 (“While the public domain test will be persuasive in most cases, it
does not reach the concerns of confidentiality in circumstances like those presented in this
case.”).
98. See Watkins, at 1197 (“Taken to its logical extreme, the ‘public domain’ test would
still shield commercial information under Exemption 4 even if CBP or an aggrieved trademark
owner opened up the phonebook and faxed a copy of the seizure notice to every importer in the
region, provided the disclosures were not preserved in some public record.”).
99. ZERO DARK THIRTY (Annapurna Pictures 2012).
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Kathryn Bigelow and writer Mark Boal) met with four officers from the
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and one Navy SEAL, all of whom
had been involved in planning the raid which led to Osama Bin Laden’s
death in Pakistan in May 2011. 100 The filmmakers were given the full
name of the Navy SEAL, but only the first names of the CIA officers. 101
Bigelow and Boal met with these officers to obtain classified information
concerning the search and raid for use in creating the film. 102
Judicial Watch, a non-profit organization, made a FOIA request for
all records of the CIA’s and the Department of Defense’s communications
with the filmmakers. 103 The Department of Defense produced one hundred
fifty three pages of records and the CIA turned over sixty seven documents
in response to the request. 104 One document produced by the Department
of Defense was a sixteen-page transcript of an interview conducted with
Bigelow and Boal. 105 At five places in the transcript, the names of three
members of the Department of Defense were redacted. 106 In one exchange
with Boal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Michael
Vickers, asked Boal not to reveal the name of one of the officers with
whom he consulted because he “shouldn’t be talking out of school.” 107
Documents produced by the CIA contained emails in which the first
names of the CIA officers that met with the filmmakers were redacted.108
The CIA explained in a declaration that it instructed the officers to only
give the filmmakers their first names, and to its knowledge that was all the

100. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 963 F. Supp. 2d 6, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2013).
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 8-9.
106. Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
107. See id. (statement of Michael Vickers from the interview transcript) (“[T]he only
thing we ask is that you not reveal his name in any way as a consultant, because again, it’s the
same thing, he shouldn’t be talking out of school, this at least, this gives him one step removed
and he knows what he can and can’t say, but this way at least he can be as open as he can with
you and it ought to meet your needs and give you lots of color.”).
108. Id.
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officers revealed of their names. 109 Judicial Watch filed suit to challenge
the government’s withholding of these names, which ordinarily are exempt
from disclosure under Exemption 3, arguing that in revealing the names to
the filmmakers, the government disclosed them in the public domain, thus
waiving the exemption. 110
2. Rejecting the Unlimited Disclosure Rule Set Forth in Watkins
Judicial Watch argued that the government made “no-strings-attached
disclosure[s]” of the names and encouraged the court to adopt the Watkins
test, which would give the filmmakers the ability to further disseminate the
information to the public and introduce the information into the public
domain. 111 The court questioned whether such an assertion was even
accurate, citing Vickers’s request to Boal that he “not reveal his name in
any way.” 112 Regardless, the court held that the exemption still applied
because Judicial Watch did not point to any specific information already in
the public domain identical to that which the government wanted to
withhold. 113 Judicial Watch then argued that the information was revealed
for film production, an unimportant purpose; therefore, the government
placed the information in the public domain.114 The court unequivocally
rejected this argument, both as being contrary to the law in the D.C.
Circuit, and as a misstatement of the holdings of the cases upon which the
theory relies. 115
109. Id. (statement from the CIA’s declaration) (“[W]hen the meetings with the
filmmakers took place at the CIA Headquarters, the guidance provided to the officers who were . .
. in sensitive positions was that they should provide the filmmakers with their true first names
only.”).
110. Id. at 11-12.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 15. (suggesting that such an assertion may not
constitute a no-strings-attached disclosure because of Vicker’s request that Boal “not reveal his
name in any way”).
113. The court also acknowledged that “[i]f the filmmakers had publicized the names that
they learned and the government now seeks to withhold, this would be a much harder case . . . .”
Id. 15-16.
114. Judicial Watch puts forward this argument as a logical continuation of decisions in
which courts have held that official disclosures do not place information in the public domain
when they are made for an important government purpose. See id. at 16.
115. Judicial Watch argued that Students Against Genocide v. Department of State, 257
F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Department of Justice, 833 F. Supp. 2d
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3. Affirming the Permanent Public Record Test
In declining to apply the unlimited disclosure rule set forth in
Watkins, the court in Judicial Watch instead reaffirmed the D.C. Circuit’s
permanent public recordpermanent public record test. 116 The court
reasoned that the purpose of the public domain doctrine, exemplified in the
permanent public recordpermanent public record test, did not apply in this
instance because the logical underpinning of the doctrine was inapplicable
to the facts of this case. 117 Judicial Watch wanted the government to
release the names because it had no other way of learning them. 118 This is
directly contrary to the purpose of the public domain doctrine, which the
court argued is to prevent the government from withholding information
that is already public knowledge. 119 The court acknowledged that there is
some flexibility in the public domain doctrine, asserting that there is no
“uniform, inflexible rule requiring every public-domain claim to be
substantiated with a hard copy simulacrum of the sought-after material.” 120
Citing Cottone v. Reno, the court noted that “information is in the public
domain for the purposes of a FOIA request if some other source of law
provides a right to access the information,” though this holding is very
limited.121
The court also considered a slight broadening of the public domain
doctrine found in Students Against Genocide, which seems to suggest that
92 (D.D.C. 2011) added a “‘governmental purpose’ element to the public domain doctrine,” but
the court determined that “[n]either of these cases [stood] for the proposition that disclosures
made for an insufficiently important governmental purpose necessarily put information into the
public domain.” Id. at 16-17.
116. See id. at 16.
117. See Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (“Because the public domain doctrine is a
doctrine of futility, triggered only when it would serve no purpose to enforce any exemption, it is
of almost no use to a plaintiff attempting to learn something that it does not already know.”).
118. Id. at 13 (“Judicial Watch does not know—and, outside of this suit, apparently has
no way of learning—the names of these individuals. That fact is strong evidence that those
names are not in the public domain.”).
119. See id. at 12.
120. Id. at 13.
121. See Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (“[A] FOIA requester who seeks
information he does not possess can still meet ‘his “burden of showing that there is permanent
public record of the exact [information] he wishes”’ . . . by pointing to his right of access to the
very information being withheld.”) (emphasis added).
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the logic behind the public domain doctrine may not require such a formal
insistence on having the information preserved in a permanent public
record. 122 However, the court found that neither case offered any real help
to Judicial Watch’s argument because it had not found any non-FOIA right
to access the names at issue, thus failing to meet Cottone’s limited
holding. 123 Furthermore, coming to any other holding under Students
Against Genocide would require the court to adopt the Ninth’s Circuit’s
unlimited disclosure test, which it rejected.124
The court then went on to hold in favor of the government, granting
its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Judicial Watch did
not sustain its burden of proof under the permanent public disclosure test
because it failed to point to “specific information in the public domain,”
which “duplicates that being withheld.” 125
IV. THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF COMPETING “PUBLIC DOMAIN” RULES
A. An Amorphous and Unworkable Permanent Public Record Test
At first glance, the permanent public recordpermanent public record
test may seem like the most logical approach to determining what
information has entered the public domain. 126 However, upon further
inspection, the test reveals weaknesses as applied to certain situations
involving confidentiality, as seen in Judicial Watch and Watkins. 127 The
permanent public recordpermanent public record test’s vague, restrictive
standard frustrates the primary purpose of FOIA and prevents the public

122. See id. 14-15 (stating that Students Against Genocide suggests that the principle
motivating doctrine— “where information requested ‘is truly public . . . enforcement of an
exemption cannot fulfill its purposes”’ —may have implications beyond the simple rule that the
government must release information that has been “‘disclosed and preserved in a permanent
public record’”) (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 15.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 17.
126. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 963 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12 (D.D.C. 2013)
(“[F]or the public domain doctrine to apply, the specific information sought must have already
been ‘disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.’”) (quoting Cottone v. Reno, 193
F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
127. See id. at 15; see generally Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011).
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from obtaining valuable information.128
1. The Test’s Unclear Standard Is Unduly Restrictive
FOIA’s main purpose is to promote the dissemination of information
to the public, unless some policy or overriding concern calls for
information to remain secret. 129 The main strength of the permanent public
recordpermanent public record test is that it promotes the disclosure of
information while still protecting certain government and business privacy
interests. 130 The test allows for a rather broad application of the nine
exemptions outlined in FOIA and provides greater protection to
government agencies seeking to withhold information from the public,
while still allowing for the waiver of some of those protections.131 Broader
protection will promote both business and government interests, as both
parties will be more likely to disclose confidential information to third
parties (which at times is necessary in order for the government or business
to function properly) if they know that such a disclosure does not
automatically activate a waiver of a FOIA exemption.132
The permanent public disclosure test also supports another, more
significant, government interest: national security. In the thirteen years
128. See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 19662006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest in Knowing
What the Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 512 (2006) (discussing the primary
purpose of FOIA).
129. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38 (1965).
130. In creating FOIA, the legislature recognized that the benefits of keeping the public
informed could run directly contrary to other societal goals and public policies that require
confidentiality to maximize effectiveness. See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 128, at 516 (“A
1965 Senate report observed that tensions among such competing values are characteristic of a
democratic society and must be resolved by a balancing of interests: ‘At the same time that a
broad philosophy of ‘freedom of information’ is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain
equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Government files.’”)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3).
131. See Patrick Lightfoot, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Nondisclosure Under FOIA’s
Exemption 4: The Scope and Applicability of the Waiver Doctrine, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 807,
828-29 (2012).
132. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 878
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (expressing concern over the way in which a lack of confidentiality could impair
the government’s ability to perform its duties, stating: “[u]nless persons having necessary
information can be assured that it will remain confidential, they may decline to cooperate with
officials[,] and the ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed decisions will be
impaired.”) (alteration in original).

LET FREEDOM RING (DO NOT DELETE)

84

7/2/2015 1:55 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and national security have
remained a prominent issue in the government, the media, and among the
general population.133 The federal government enacted the Patriot Act in
2001, which gave the government several new avenues by which to fight
terrorism and had the effect of eroding citizens’ privacy rights, while
enhancing the government’s ability to keep its actions secret. 134 Edward
Lee notes many examples of this increased government secrecy in his
article, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or
Intellectual Property:
Under the Patriot Act, the government also has (4) more
expansive powers to conduct FISA searches and
surveillance of individuals in the United States, which are
authorized and executed in secret. Other areas of
enhanced secrecy involve denying the public access to
information: the government has (5) ordered agencies and
libraries to remove from government Web sites
information that was once publicly available, (6) instructed
government employees to scrutinize Freedom of
Information Act requests with greater stringency,
abandoning the prior Administration’s presumption of
openness, and (7) asked researchers and scientists not to
publish findings that might possibly be used by terrorists
in an attack against the United States, a request acceded to
by the top scientific journals. 135
Such legislation raises unique legal as well as ethical issues. What
constraints, if any, can and should be placed on the government’s ability to
withhold information from the public? Does the “end” of national security
justify any “means” of achieving it? From an ethical standpoint, there is no
obvious answer. Most people would probably agree that there is a certain
133. See generally The Zero Dark Thirty File: Lifting the Government’s Shroud over the
Mission that Killed Osama bin Laden, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB410/.
134. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001).
135. Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 91, 121-22 (2003).
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line that the government should not cross; however, where exactly that line
between personal liberty and government power should be drawn is not at
all apparent.
Conversely, from a legal perspective the answer is a bit clearer. As
Lee notes, beyond the scope of FOIA and national security concerns,
“[c]ourts have long recognized the concept of the public domain as a
restraint on the government’s power to use secrecy.” 136 For example, in
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Cox broadcasting company identified
a rape victim during television coverage of the victim’s alleged rapists. 137
Cox had obtained the name from the indictments—public records—and
thus available to the public for inspection. 138 The rape victim’s father then
brought a damages action against Cox, under a Georgia statute that
criminalized the broadcasting of a rape victim’s name, claiming that Cox
had violated his right to privacy. 139 The Court held that Cox could not be
held civilly liable because the First Amendment forbids such an imposition
of liability based on information revealed in open court or public
records. 140 Cox and the cases that followed established a bright-line rule
that “information revealed in open court” receives First Amendment
protection. 141 Such information essentially enters the public domain and
can no longer be held in secret. 142 Applying the D.C. Circuit’s test to a
situation like Cox would be relatively straightforward and yield the same
result. 143 The public domain doctrine culled from the cases following Cox
essentially confines the public domain doctrine to the physical location
from which the information originates—the public court records. 144
136. Id. at 123.
137. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1975).
138. Id. at 472.
139. Id. at 474.
140. See id. at 495.
141. Lee, supra note 135, at 124.
142. Id. (“Once material enters the public domain, the government is not free to restrain
its dissemination, whether through intellectual property law or government secrecy.”).
143. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 551 (holding that wiretapped recordings introduced into
evidence and played in open court had been entered into the public domain, waiving any FOIA
exemption to their disclosure).
144. Lee, supra note 135, at 124.
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Such a restriction makes application of the public domain doctrine in
First Amendment cases much simpler than its application in FOIA cases.145
Under the rule in a FOIA action, information does not enter the public
domain unless it is preserved in a “permanent public record.” 146 This can
include indictments and other public court records, as seen in Cox, but it is
not limited to such records. 147 And herein lies the primary weakness of the
test: there is no set definition as to what constitutes a “permanent public
record.” As discussed in Part II, section A, case law has found recordings
played in open court to be preserved in a permanent public record,148 but
not recordings simply given to opposing counsel in court, 149 nor
photographs displayed in a meeting with foreign leaders, 150 nor public
testimony before congressional committees. 151 The rule seems to require
some sort of written, physical recording of the information, 152 but if that is
the case, what is the timeframe during which it must be recorded? Must it
be immediately recorded when the information is transmitted, or can there
be some sort of lag time? In Public Citizen v. Department of State, the
court questioned that if the latter is allowed, is the information deemed to
have entered the public domain at the moment of transference, or at the
moment of recording? 153
Additionally, the test raises the question of exactly how public a
recording must be in order to qualify as the information entering the public
domain. The ambiguous standard needlessly breeds uncertainty and
inefficiency in the court system. Even if the court were to delineate a
clearer definition of “permanent public record,” with constant advances in
technology and the changing nature of businesses and the way in which
people communicate, there would likely never emerge a true bright-line

145. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., id. at 555.
148. Id. at 556.
149. Id.
150. Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
151. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 11 F.3d 198, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
152. See Lee, supra note 135, at 124.
153. See generally Pub. Citizen, 11 F.3d 198.
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rule beyond the well-established “revealed in open court” rule. Thus, even
with further clarification from the courts, the D.C. Circuit’s standard will
always remain somewhat ambiguous and difficult to administer.
2. The Ambiguity of the Test Frustrates
the Purpose of the Public Domain Doctrine
Furthermore, the permanent public record test could potentially allow
for information that has already entered the public domain to remain
exempt under FOIA simply because it was not affixed in a permanent
public record.154 Theoretically, certain information could be shielded by an
exemption, even if the government broadcast the information to the general
public, simply because it was not affixed in some public record.155 Such an
outcome would be absurd and completely contrary to the purpose of the
public domain doctrine’s role in waiving a FOIA exemption—if
information is already publicly known, there is no sense in withholding it
from disclosure. 156
Finally, the permanent public record test is much more restrictive than
the Ninth Circuit’s new test, and thus limits the amount of information
disclosed to the public. FOIA’s primary purpose is full disclosure of
information to the public. 157 This purpose is hindered and frustrated by a
test that could allow documents and other sources, the content of which are
already known by the public, to be withheld from the public via a statutory
loophole.

154. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197.
155. See id. (“Taken to its logical extreme, the ‘public domain’ test would still shield
commercial information under Exemption 4 even if CBP or an aggrieved trademark owner
opened up the phonebook and faxed a copy of the seizure notice to every importer in the region,
provided the disclosures were not preserved in some public record.”).
156. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the information is publicly available, one wonders, why is it burning up counsel
fees to obtain it under FOIA? But the logic of FOIA compels the result: if identical information is
truly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its purposes.”).
157. Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 128, at 537.
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B. The Unlimited Disclosure Test Offers an Alternative
with Less Ambiguity and Better Practical Application
1. The Unlimited Disclosure Test Better Serves the Purposes of FOIA
The test set forth in Watkins has a broader application than the
permanent public record test. Because the rule requires that the individual
disclosing the information take some action to prevent its further
dissemination, essentially any disclosure to a third party would operate as a
release of information into the public domain. 158 The test assumes that any
such disclosure has entered the public domain.159 This shifts the burden of
proving that an exemption has been waived from the party making the
FOIA request (who must prove that a disclosure is preserved in a
permanent public record) to the party disclosing the information (who must
prove that they took some measure to prevent its further disclosure). While
this marks a significant change from the existing law surrounding the
waiver doctrine, 160 such a shift is desirable because it promotes full
disclosure of information to the public, the core principle underlying
FOIA. 161
2. The Unlimited Disclosure Test Is Easily Administrable
and the Government’s Privacy Is Easily Protectable
Through the Use of Non-Disclosure Agreements
The Ninth Circuit’s test states that, “when an agency freely discloses
to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption
without limiting the third-party’s ability to further disseminate the
information then the agency waives the ability to claim an exemption to a
FOIA request for the disclosed information.” 162 Only information that the
disclosing party fails to protect in some way enters the public domain upon
disclosure. Opponents of this test argue that it is too broad and would
158. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1198.
159. See id. at 1196.
160. See Lightfoot, supra note 131, at 828-29 (“[T]he court’s holding broadened the
waiver doctrine by significantly departing from prevailing law. The bulk of the court’s reasoning
focused on the potential for further disclosure by a third party, rather than actual disclosure in the
public domain.”) (emphasis in original).
161. Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 128, at 515.
162. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added).
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allow for the disclosure of too much confidential information, which would
disrupt business practices and the performance of government functions.163
However, this potentially detrimental effect can be easily avoided or
mitigated by the implementation of non-disclosure agreements. 164 A nondisclosure agreement (“NDA”) is relatively simple to implement and costeffective. 165 NDAs are commonly used in business to protect confidential
information, such as trade secrets, from reaching competitors.166 As
detailed above in Part II, section B, the information sought to be withheld
in Watkins fell under Exemption 4, which exempts business information
such as trade secrets and other confidential commercial or financial
information. 167 Such information is precisely the kind that NDAs are
generally designed to protect and for which are generally used in the
regular course of business. 168
Though NDAs are generally found in the business world,169 there is
no apparent reason why the government could not utilize them to prevent
further disclosure of information they have disclosed to a third party but do
not wish to have enter the public domain. In this way, the broad effect of
the unlimited disclosure test is mitigated so as to prevent the government
from having to reveal too much confidential or potentially compromising
information.
Furthermore, the use of NDAs makes the test easily administrable.170
163. See Lightfoot, supra note 131, at 834 (“If the Watkins holding stands, the concerns
voiced by the court in Critical Mass regarding the continued availability and reliability of useful
information may come to fruition. Individuals who provide commercial information to the
government, will be less willing to do so, and if compelled to do so, will provide less reliable
information for fear that any government disclosure of the information—even a limited one—will
subject the information to FOIA disclosure.”).
164. Non-disclosure agreements are “contracts entered into by two or more parties in
which some or all of the parties agree that certain types of information that pass from one party to
the other or that are created by one of the parties will remain confidential.” David V. Radack,
Understanding Confidentiality Agreements, J. MIN., METALS, AND MATERIALS SOC’Y, May
1994, at 68.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012).
168. See Radack, supra note 164, at 68.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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Unlike the “permanent public disclosure” test, the use of NDAs would
create a clear bright-line distinction between which disclosures have
entered the public domain and which have not. Rather than courts trying to
parse the meaning of “permanent” or trying to figure out what exactly
constitutes a public record, they would simply have to look at the facts of
the case and see if the disclosing party used an NDA or not. 171 If they did
use an NDA, then they did not make an unlimited disclosure to a third party
and such disclosure does not constitute a waiver of any applicable
exemption. If they did not use an NDA, then their disclosure constitutes a
waiver of any FOIA exemption that may apply.
Of course, regardless of an NDA, an individual might choose to
publicly reveal the information, such as on the Internet. In such instances,
the NDA would no longer prevent the waiver of any exemptions and a
FOIA request for the information would be granted because the
information has definitively entered the public domain. However, this
would be the result under the prevailing D.C. Circuit rule as well, and the
implementation of NDAs provides potential remedies in such situations.
The use of NDAs in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit’s rule will not
always prevent information that the government wishes to keep secret from
entering the public domain.172 Nonetheless, using NDAs allows the
government the option of filing a breach of contract claim in response to an
individual violating the NDA, giving them the possibility to recover
damages. 173 Furthermore, the threat of litigation would serve as a deterrent
to anyone considering breaking the NDA and publicly disclosing the
information. 174
Additionally, the court could infer from the party’s failure to use an
NDA that the information it is seeking to withhold is not very important
and thus not worthy of heightened protection. 175 Though the court in
Judicial Watch rejected this argument, 176 it is worth exploring. The
171. See id.
172. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196.
173. See Radack, supra note 164, at 68.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. The court stated that under the law of D.C. Circuit, only specific information
preserved in a permanent public record is within the public domain. This does not include an
undocumented disclosure “made for an unimportant reason.” Judicial Watch, Inc., 963 F. Supp.
2d at 16.
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purpose of the FOIA exemptions is to protect certain interests—
government, business, individual privacy—which are equally as important
as the public’s interest in full disclosure. 177 They are discretionary, not
mandatory, and are meant to be narrowly construed.178 Information that
falls under these exemptions is thus equally as important as the supreme
interest in public disclosure underlying FOIA. 179 It is logical to infer then
that the government would not freely disclose such information and if it
did, would naturally take some sort of measure to ensure that the
information would not be disseminated beyond the person or persons who
were the intended recipient(s). Hence, the implementation of an NDA
seems to be the most logical and rational approach to best protect such
important, sensitive information, which is ultimately the goal of the
exemptions in the first place.
3. Application to Judicial Watch
Turning to the facts in Judicial Watch, the government made an
unlimited disclosure of sensitive information to two filmmakers. 180 This
disclosure could have very simply been limited by the use of an NDA.
However, the government did not take material action to protect the
information from being further disseminated, only asking that the
filmmakers not tell anyone. 181 This seems like a particularly nonsensical
move on the government’s part, given that part of the filmmakers’ job is
doing press about their film in which they discuss the process of making
the film and their research. At any point in time, the filmmakers could
have easily revealed the names of the government agents to a large, public
audience. Under the permanent public record test followed by the court,
theoretically, the filmmakers could have told the names to anyone and
everyone they knew and avoided waiving any FOIA exemptions as long as
they did not record the names in some public way.
This all seems to lead to a rather absurd result, one which gives the
government an unnecessary safety net protecting information that they did
not deem important enough to bother trying to protect in the first place.
177. See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 128, at 516.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Judicial Watch, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
181. Id.
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Such a government interest surely cannot be deemed equal to that of the
public’s desire to know as much as they can about one of the most
monumental military operations in modern memory. 182 Citing national
security concerns, the government has declined to provide a definitive
account of how Osama bin Laden was killed. 183 This has led the public to
turn to unofficial sources, such as Zero Dark Thirty, to determine what
exactly happened.184 While such a result might hold up under the
technicalities of FOIA, it does not make much sense in light of the
underlying purposes of the act. The public should not have to rely on a
dramatized version of events produced by Hollywood as its source of
information on such a historical event.
V. CALL TO ACTION
Splits in the law between circuits, while beneficial for ambitious law
students, are detrimental to the operation of the judicial system as a whole.
When there is no clear rule of law, the public and the government have no
understanding as to what actions they must take, or avoid, in order to
prevent a disclosure of information to a third party from entering the public
domain. This uncertainty could ultimately frustrate the purported main
advantage of the prevailing permanent public record test. People will be
less likely to reveal confidential information because they do not know
their rights, and business and government practices will be hindered. The
lack of a clear rule also makes FOIA that much more difficult for courts to
administer, causing protracted litigation and a waste of limited judicial
resources.
Congress should amend FOIA to reaffirm the public domain doctrine,
namely that an agency waives any exemption under FOIA if it makes a
disclosure to a third party without limiting that third party’s ability to
further disclose the information. Congress has already amended FOIA

182. See The Zero Dark Thirty File: Lifting the Government’s Shroud Over the Mission
that Killed Osama bin Laden, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Jan. 17, 2013)
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB410/.
183. Id.
184. See US PATRIOT ACT supra note 134, (“As often happens when the government
declines on secrecy grounds to provide an authoritative account of a controversial event, leaked,
unauthorized and untrustworthy versions rush to fill the void. In this extraordinary case, a
Hollywood motion picture, with apparent White House, CIA, and Pentagon blessing and despite
its historical inaccuracies, is now the closest thing to the official story behind the pursuit of bin
Laden.”).
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numerous times 185 and is in a good position to determine a prevailing test
governing the public domain. Congress has the ability to conduct hearings
with various government agencies to determine any concerns they may
have regarding an amendment and can research the efficacy of NDAs and
other issues concerning the public domain. 186 The Legislature is best able
to clarify and improve its own statutes.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari on Judicial
Watch and determine that the Ninth Circuit’s test should be the rule for
determining whether a disclosure has entered the public domain. As
outlined in the above section, the Ninth Circuit’s rule better serves the
purpose of full disclosure underlying FOIA, and the potential problem of
excess disclosure can be easily mitigated by using NDAs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act works to promote the dissemination
of information to the public. 187 In order to best accomplish this goal, it is
crucial that there be uniformity amongst the lower courts regarding certain
doctrines underlying the act. Inconsistent application of the waiver
doctrine, due to competing tests for determining when information enters
the public domain, cripples the effect of FOIA and greatly frustrates its
ability to accomplish its primary purpose.
Though the Ninth Circuit’s unlimited disclosure test is a large
departure from the prevailing permanent public record test, it offers the
better framework for determining when a disclosure has constituted a
waiver of a FOIA exemption. The Ninth Circuit’s test offers broad
dissemination of information while still providing plenty of opportunity for
the government, businesses, and individuals to protect their own interests.
It is ultimately a test that best serves the primary purpose of FOIA while
still implementing safeguards to prevent the disclosure of information from
becoming detrimentally broad.

185. FOIA Legislative History, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://www2.gw
u.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (last visited Oct 24, 2014).
186. See generally S. REP. NO. 89-813 (1965).
187. See id. at 38.

